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                                                              Abstract: 
There is a chronological parallelism between the surge of the natural gas sector in the Western Mediterranean and the 
setting up of the post-colonial Algerian economy in the early 1970s, which has led to the accretion of a series of cross-
border and regional relationships of dependency. Because of Algeria’s overwhelming financial dependence on 
hydrocarbon resources (via economic rents), any attempt to modify the power relationship within its regional gas chain 
would immediately alter the way its political economy functions. This article presents a first outline of a 
methodological proposal aimed at analysing how the integration of the Algerian gas sector into regional gas chains in 
the Western Mediterranean affects the internal functioning of a rentier economy such as Algeria. By exploring the 
literature that helps capturing the relational effect between the Algerian domestic economy and the regional gas & oil 
structure of governance, the article suggests some analytical tools with the aim to evaluate the capacity of power and 
influence of each of the agents involved in the energy chain, from both Algeria and the other countries in the region. 
 
Keywords: Algeria, Western Mediterranean, natural gas, energy, regional integration, global value chain, 
global commodity chain, rentier state 
 
            Título en Castellano: Interdependencia energética: el nexo de la economía política del gas 
natural de Argelia con el Mediterráneo occidental. Un enfoque metodológico 
                                                               Resumen:  
Existe un paralelismo cronológico entre el surgimiento del sector del gas natural en el Mediterráneo Occidental y el 
establecimiento de una economía poscolonial argelina a principios de los setenta, que ha llevado a la acumulación 
de una serie de relaciones de dependencia transfronterizas y regionales. Debido a la abrumadora dependencia 
financiera de Argelia de los recursos de hidrocarburos (a través de rentas económicas), cualquier intento de modificar 
la relación de poder dentro de su cadena regional de gas alteraría inmediatamente la forma en que funciona su 
economía política. Este documento presenta un primer esbozo de una propuesta metodológica destinada a analizar 
cómo la integración del sector del gas argelino en las cadenas de gas regionales en el Mediterráneo occidental afecta 
el funcionamiento interno de una economía rentista como la argelina. Al explorar la literatura que ayuda a capturar 
el efecto relacional entre la economía interna de Argelia y la estructura regional de gas y petróleo de gobierno, el 
documento sugiere algunas herramientas analíticas con el objetivo de evaluar la capacidad de poder e influencia de 
cada uno de los agentes involucrados en la cadena de energía, tanto de Argelia como de otros países de la región. 
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1. Introduction2 
This article presents a first outline of a methodological proposal aimed to analyse how the 
integration of the Algerian gas sector into regional gas chains in the Western Mediterranean3 
affects the internal functioning of a rentier economy such as Algeria. This article intends to 
contribute to the analysis of the political economy of energy in North Africa, in particular of 
Algeria, by connecting the exploitation of its gas fields with the transportation and 
commercialization of natural gas to the final markets in Southern Europe.  
 Whereas Algeria’s overwhelming financial dependence on hydrocarbon resources (via 
economic rents) is directly linked to its decision-making capacity within the regional gas chain, 
the article aims at offering tools to assess how any attempt to modify the power relationships 
within its regional gas chain will immediately alter the way its political economy functions. 
Hence, to demonstrate theoretically that the relational nature of the domestic dimension of the 
political economy of the Algerian gas vis-à-vis the political economy of gas in the Western 
Mediterranean region as a whole is meaningful. 
 The article also explores the literature that helps to catch up the relational effect between 
the Algerian domestic economy and the regional gas & oil structure of governance. To this end, 
we aim at conceptualizing a methodology that underpins the literature on development 
economics, rentier states and international political economy, and how the latter can be applied 
to the examination of the natural gas value chain and production network in the Western 
Mediterranean (from the gas fields in Algeria to the final consumers in the north western 
Mediterranean countries). We will couple it with analytical frameworks such as the Global 
Commodity Chain (GCC), Global Value Chain (GVC) and Global Production Netwkork (GPN) 
that place at its core focus the concern with regionally inter-organisational relationships that 
underpin the power and value dynamics therein.  
 
 Based on this methodology the article suggests two complementary analytical tools, one 
qualitative and one quantitative, with the aim to evaluate the capacity of power and influence 
of each of the agents involved in the energy chain (companies and governments of the countries 
where the gas value chain’s activity takes place). The resulting outcome may prove to be robust 
and consistent enough as to determine how the existing linkage between the domestic and the 
regional sides help to explain Algeria’s political economy and why researchers need to consider 
this relational nature when trying to understand the past, present and future decisions of that 
country.  
 More broadly, we defend that these analytical tools could also be useful as to underscore 
the nature of integration (symmetrical or asymmetrical) that takes place between different 
companies that participate in regional value chains and between the latter and governments of 
                                                          
2
 The contribution of Aurèlia Mañé-Estrada is the the result of the R&D projects "The international dimension of 
political transformations in the Arab-Islamic world", (CSO2014-52998-C3-3-P), and "Crisis and regional change 
processes in North Africa. Implications for Spain" (CSO2017-84949-C3-3-P) funded by the Ministry of 
Economy, Industry and Competitiveness (MINECO), the State Research Agency (AEI) and the European 
Regional Development Fund (FEDER). 
3
 From an institutional standpoint, the geopolitical term “Western Mediterranean” brings together ten countries, 
five from the north Western and five from the south-Western Mediterranean. For the purposes of this paper, the 
term “Western Mediterranean” refers to a regional geo-energy limited space built upon transnational and cross-
border natural gas transport projects and significant LNG trade flows, which have led to a set of energy 
relationships and physical interconnections amongst different public and private agents from Algeria, France, Italy, 
Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. 
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those territories across which natural gas flows from producers to consumers. At this point, we 
assume that the more symmetrical and entangled a geo-energy space becomes, the more stable 
and therefore secure these relations will be; while if asymmetry emerges, the greater the 
possibility will be of conflict among them, due to the antagonism of interests.  
 The article is structured in three sections. First, we briefly review the surge of the natural 
gas sector in the Western Mediterranean countries, and how there is a chronological parallelism 
between the emergence of the gas sector in the Western Mediterranean and the setting up of the 
post-colonial Algerian economy in the early 1970s, which is both undeveloped and rentier, 
being heavily dependent on the rents accrued from exploiting the country’s natural gas and oil. 
Likewise, since the 1970s southern European countries started relying on multiple sources to 
meet their gas consumption requirements, most notably from Algeria, which prompted the 
emergence of a geo-energy space in the gas sector among the Western Mediterranean countries, 
leading to the accretion of a series of cross-border and transnational relationships of 
dependency. 
 Secondly, the article aims to assess the main features of the Algerian political economy 
in order to show that most of the explanations about the functioning of the Algerian economy, 
especially those related to its rentier behaviour and the ‘resource curse', are not comprehensive 
enough because they do not catch the relational factor, which is the one that GCC/GVC/GPN 
approaches provide.  
 Thirdly, the article reviews the literature of these approaches to relate it to the case of 
the gas chain in the Western Mediterranean. Last, but not least, in this section the article 
proposes two innovative analytical tools. 
2. Historical and relational nature of Algeria’s geo-energy space  
2.1 The surge of a natural gas sector in the Western Mediterranean countries 
In the case of north Western Mediterranean countries (Italy, France, Spain and Portugal) 
dependency on imported natural gas has been even higher than the average European countries, 
in spite of domestic consumption of natural gas grew slowly through the 1960s and 1970s, 
remaining below 20 bcm4 per year until 19745, as reflected in Figure 1. The EU-28 energy 
dependency rate reached 69,3% in 2015, whereas for Spain reached 96,9%, for Italy 90,3% and 
for France 98,7%6. 
 Italy and France that are the highest natural gas importers and consumers in the region 
are not countries well endowed with domestic primary energy resources. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War period both countries followed the rest of Western Europe in switching 
from a coal to a petroleum-based energy system, with the significant caveat that Italy would 
take an early lead in utilising gas resources7. Unlike Italy, the first oil crisis of 1973, prompted 
France to embark on a major nuclear power programme to ensure its energy independence, 
whereas Italy made significant gas discoveries in the Po Valley of northern Italy, which 
                                                          
4
 Billion cubic metres 
5
 Data avaiable in BP Statistical Review of World Energy, at http://www.bp.com  
6
 According to the statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) (2018), in http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
7
 Darmstadter, Joel et al. (1971): Energy in the world economy: a statistical review of trends in output, trade and 
consumption since 1925, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press.  
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propelled major Italian firms into a virtuous circle of growth by exploiting natural gas 
resources8. 
 In contrast, Spain and Portugal followed a different path, despite not being endowed 
with plentiful domestic energy resources like France and Italy. Transition from coal to 
hydrocarbon-based energy model came very late during the 1960s at a time in which oil prices 
were quite low. In 1975, an agreement between Enagas and Sontrach was signed for the 
delivery, from 1979 and for a period of 20 years, of a volume of LNG which exceeded the needs 
of the Spanish economy in the midst of a deep economic crisis 9 . Disagreement over the 
quantities, price and supply conditions of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) was one of the central 
issues in Spanish-Algerian relations and contaminated the bilateral agenda during the period of 
1982-198510 and it was not until the beginning of the 1990s that thanks to the opening of the 
Spanish gas and electric power markets spurred new investment, particularly in the new gas-
fired power generation 11 . The improvement of bilateral relations with North Africa also 
stimulated a burgeoning gas market and the building of new interconnections along the 
Maghreb countries; infrastructure that Italy had built at a much earlier stage. In its turn, Portugal 
has never relied too intensively on gas resources as reflected in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Consumption of natural gas in the north Western Mediterranean (1971-2015) 
 
Sources: Own elaboration from BP and IEA (2016) 
 
Precisely because the north Western Mediterranean countries, in particular Italy, France and 
Spain were seeking to expand natural gas consumption, whilst massive proven gas reserves 
                                                          
8
 Pozzi, Daniele: “Techno-Managerial Competences in Enrico Mattei’s AGIP: A Prolonged Accumulation Process 
in an International Network, 1935-1965”, Business and Economic History, vol. 1 (January 2003) 
9
 Portillo, Juan María (2000): El papel del gas natural en las relaciones hispano-argelinas: 1970-1985, Madrid, 
UNISCI.  
10
 Hernando de Larramendi, Miguel y Mañé-Estrada, Aurèlia (2012): “Las relaciones hispano-argelinas durante 
los gobiernos de Felipe González (1982-1996)”, en Marquina, Antonio (ed.): Las relaciones hispano-argelinas. 
Contexto histórico, desafíos y proyectos comunes, Madrid, Foro Hispano-Argelino, pp. 42-68.  
11
 Mañé Estrada, Aurèlia: “L’intégration du gaz algérien dans le système énergétique espagnol”, Confluences 
Méditerrannées, Vol. 71 (Automne 2009), pp. 135-152. 
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were found in Algeria, projects to import gas from the latter via pipeline or by ship were 
proposed and discussed at the highest levels of government and in state-owned energy 
companies during the second half of the 1970s. For different purposes that we will assess later 
on, Italy and France managed to succeed at quite early stage, whereas Spain and Portugal did 
not tap their opportunities until 1990s. Table 1 shows trade volumes of natural gas between 
Algeria and the four countries in the north Western Mediterranean area in 2006 and in 2016. 
During these ten years span, trade volumes have remained quite stable with a relatively weak 
decline in demand as result of diversification of imports amongst the observed EU countries 
and the lower production capacity of natural gas offered by Algeria. 
Table 1. Natural gas trade volumes from Algeria (in bcm) 
  
2006 2016 
Italy By pipeline 24,46 17,2 
LNG 3 0,1 
France By pipeline - - 
LNG 7,35 6,2 
Spain By pipeline 8,62 11,8 
LNG 2,8 2,9 
Portugal By pipeline 2,1 1 
LNG - 0,25 
Rest of Europe By pipeline 0,44 2,5 
LNG 5,8 0,9 
Rest of the world By pipeline 1,3 4,6 
LNG 5,73 5,5 
Sources: Own elaboration from BP and Eurostat 
 
2.2 The surge of the natural gas sector in Algeria 
Major gas discoveries in Algeria date back to the period between 1954 and 1959 during the 
times of French colonial rule. In 1961 Hassi R’Mel field commenced production, initially to 
supply the cities of Algiers and Oran12. After a long war against the colonial ruler France, 
Algeria achieved independence in July 1962. Within eighteen months the first state enterprise, 
the Societé Nationale pour le Transport et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures 
(Sonatrach) was founded to engage in the oil and gas businesses.  
 The world’s first commercial gas liquefaction plant was developed in Arzew (north of 
Algeria) in 1964, with the Algerian company CAMEL (Compagnie Algerienne de Methane 
Liquide) shipping LNG to the UK and later to France13. Sonatrach would later assume control 
of the operation and contract. The liquefaction of natural gas is completely dependent on export 
markets and was, until the building of the first gas interconnection pipelines, the only option to 
export gas. Gas exports quickly became a focus of the Algerian government as the latter 
increased its control over the country’s oil and gas resources, although in 1980, they represented 
                                                          
12
 Aïssaoui, Ali (2001): Algeria: The political economy of gas and oil, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
13
 Aïssaoui, op. cit, pp. 154-156.  
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only 12.88%14 of the country's total hydrocarbon exports, and it was not until the turn of the 
century that it surpassed oil as an export item.  
Figure 2. Production of natural gas in Algeria and total in the African continent (1971-
2015) 
 
Source: BP (2016) 
 
Figure 3. Share of Algeria’s natural gas production in world production excluding the two 
main producers (Russian Federation15 and the US)  
 
Source: own elaboration from BP (2016) 
 
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, during the 1960s and most of the 1970s Algeria was mainly 
focused on the exploitation of the oil industry in spite of Algeria’s modest potential as producer 
in comparison with gas. The development of the country’s comparatively abundant gas 
resources would only be given full consideration in the second half of the 1970s when the 
corresponding policies were incorporated into the 1976 National Charter and marked the shift 
from oil to natural gas as the main focus of energy policy. The accession of Algeria into the 
OPEC in 1969, the late coming demand of natural gas from southern European markets, as well 
as the failed attempt to export big amounts of LNG to the United States (contracts signed with 
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 Ministère d’Énergie et Mines de l’Algérie, at http://www.energy.gov.dz/francais/.  
15
 Before 1985, the data comes from the USSR  
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Tenneco and El Paso Natural Gas Company II that were never approved by the US 
administration and failed to come into force16) delayed the required massive capital investments 
to properly exploit and process the available natural gas resources.   
 Foreign events also favoured this radical shift in gas export policy. Rising OPEC power 
and the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution resulted in sky-rocketing oil prices. The volumes 
of Algerian oil exports remained relatively constant, but surging prices created overflowing 
exports revenues. The mind-set among hydrocarbon exporters was that greater export revenues 
could be generated from higher prices than from higher export volumes17. In this context, the 
Algerian and Sonatrach leadership saw the opportunity to push for price increases for its gas 
exports in line with the high oil prices. 
 A few years earlier, from 1965 until 1969 under the presidency of Hourari Boumediene, 
Algeria pursued state control of all strategic assets in the country, including the hydrocarbon 
industry. This led to bitter negotiations with the former colonial ruler France, which tainted 
relations for decades to come.  
 Energy cooperation between Algeria and France prior to 1971 was underpinned by the 
Evian Accord (1962), which ruled the transition from the independence war to statehood and 
established new principles for the exploitation of Algeria’s hydrocarbon resources, and by the 
Franco-Algerian Agreement (1965), which introduced a more balanced framework for co-
operation in the hydrocarbon sector. Yet for Algeria, profound disputes with France over oil 
prices and the tax regime prevailed during the implementation of the 1965 Agreement. The 
latter, coupled with Algeria’s membership into the OPEC that offered Algeria diplomatic 
backing during its disputes with France, as well as an increasing nationalist narrative fuelled by 
president Boumedine and his government, created in 1971 a perfect storm for nationalisation to 
be decided upon. By 1971 the government had assumed control over the hydrocarbon industry, 
Sonatrach assured complete control over gas production and transmission in a context 
characterised by a nationalist energy policy18  as nationalisation was defined as "an act of 
liberation of great political significance"19. Therefore, since then, Algeria's political fortunes 
have been tied to that of its hydrocarbon sector.  
 Whereas gas trade cooperation between Algeria and the countries in the Iberian 
Peninsula was almost non-existent20 in those years, Italy that was the largest gas producer and 
consumer in Western Europe in the 1960s21 and whose authorities had promoted courtship with 
the insurgent FLN22 in Algeria, managed to secure a first contract in 1973 to supply Algerian 
gas to Italy23. Nonetheless, it was not until 1979 that the construction of the first sub-sea gas 
                                                          
16
 Aït Laoussine, Nordine Ait: “LNG Exports, a Contribution to World Energy Supplies in the Decades to Come”, 
OPEC Review (October 1977), pp. 21-35,  
17
 Aïssaoui, op. cit. 
18
 See Mañé, op. cit. 
19
 Charte Nationale Algerienne, at https://www.joradp.dz/JO8499/1986/007/F_Pag.htm, p.131 
20
 The Spanish gas utilities company Catalana de Gas, under the bright leadership of Pere Duran Farell, succeeded 
in bringing a first LNG carrier in Barcelona in 1969. See Mañé, op. cit.; and Thieux, Laurence and Jordá, 
Almudena: “Estudios de caso de la política exterior española hacia el Mundo Árabe y Musulmán: Argelia”, Revista 
de Estudios Internacionales del Mediterráneo (REIM), nº 12 (2012), pp. 69-86 
21
 See Darmstadter, J. et al., op. cit. 
22
 Front de Libération Nationale. Political movement established in 1954 to liberate Algeria from colonial ruler 
France, and which has dominated the country’s institutions since independence in 1962 
23
 The contract was signed by the Italian hydrocarbon utilities company Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) and the 
Algerian Sonatrach for 11.25 bcm of gas per year over 25 years  
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pipeline between Algeria and a foreign country (Italy via Tunisia) did not begin, the known 
Transmed project, which could not start operating until 1983 after a lengthy renegotiation of 
the gas prices, which did also have impact on the LNG import prices for France. Similarly, but 
at a much later stage in 1996, the Gaz Maghreb Europe pipeline was finally built, spanning 
Morocco and passing under the Strait of Gibraltar to bring Algerian gas to Spain and from there 
to Portugal. In addition, a third under-sea pipeline directly connecting Algeria and Spain was 
inaugurated in 2011. 
 Hence, the year 1971 earmarks a shifting point in the development course of Algeria’s 
hydrocarbon sector, because this was the year when SONATRACH and the hydrocarbon sector 
became the source of the political power in Algeria, and one of the main elements that formed 
the post-colonial Algerian Social Contract. Therefore, SONATRACH, being the National Oil 
Company (NOC)24 became the main instrument of political intervention25. 
 Therefore, from an energy cooperation standpoint, as well as others, there is little doubt 
that the 1971 nationalisation process of the gas and oil industries in the country has more 
implications than the 1965 independence process in defining the type of relations that Algerian 
NOC would be forging with its Western Mediterranean counterparts IOCs26 in the pathway 
toward energy cooperation.  
 We cannot speak of the latter by then, but we can set in 1971 a starting point from which 
different agents –public and private- from different countries in the Western Mediterranean are 
in operation to progressively build up an architecture of institutions and processes –formal and 
informal, public and private-, which will contribute to the formation of a new geo-energy 
space2728, which shaped the regional power relations between Algeria and its Western partners. 
That is why, considering the specific elements that conform the political economy of Algeria, 
by forging this relational community, one can no longer address the domestic dimension of the 
gas industry without properly incorporating the regional and external dimension therein. 
 If we look at the recent evolution in the production of Algeria’s natural gas, one will 
conclude that it has maintained a rather stable trend, in spite of the last financial and economic 
crisis, in comparison with the world’s largest producers. In Figure 4, we can assess the evolution 
of production of gas for the main world producers since the year 2000, including Algeria’s 
which ranks number nine. 
                                                          
24
 National Oil Company (NOC) is a commonly used term to refer to state-owned upstream companies, which 
might also engage in midstream activity, and which serve as an instrument of national, public intervention with 
the main objective of generating as much national income as possible for the producing country. With the passing 
of the time, some of these companies have become transnational, and thus have been used as instruments to gain 
power on the regional or international stage, see The World Bank Group: “The Petroleum Sector Value Chain”, 
(June 2009), Washington DC. 
25
 See SEEP (2074): Rapport Général. Second Plan Quadriennal, 1974–77, Alger, p. 49 
26
 International Oil Company (IOC) or Private Oil Company (POC) are commonly used terms to refer to large, 
integrated, private and transnational energy companies that are clustered around the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). Their main objective, like most of private companies, is to obtain as much profit as possible, see The World 
Bank Group: “The Petroleum Sector Value Chain”, (June 2009), Washington DC. 
27
 A geographical space where a precise set of relationships take place, among different agents, be them producer 
states, enterprises and consumer governments, who are active within it (see further reference in section 3.3)  
28
 Mañé-Estrada, Aurèlia: “European energy security: Towards the creation of the geo-energy space”, Energy 
Policy, Vol. 34, nº18 (December 2006), pp. 3773-3786. 
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Figure 4. Production of natural gas of the world’s largest producers (2000-2016) 
 
Source: own elaboration from BP (2016) 
 
During the last decades, the emergence of a geo-energy space in the Western Mediterranean 
has placed Algeria at the heart of the model. Even regional rivalries (i.e. between Morocco and 
Algeria) or domestic instability (Algerian civil war) did not prevent the sector to develop itself 
throughout the area. The regional market has been dominated by IOCs from Southern Europe, 
together with local monopolies from the Maghreb and managed through Long-Term Contracts, 
which are at the same time an incentive for investors on the basis of stability, and a barrier for 
innovation, productivity… due to the stable nature of the contracts. 
 In this regard, most of the applied methodologies that aim at analysing the development 
trends of Algeria on the basis of the expansion and consolidation of its oil and gas industry miss 
the relational linkage through which production is organised via inter-firm networks that exceed 
the boundaries of the nation state. As we have reviewed in the present section, in the case of 
the natural gas market, these networks are shaped in the form of vertical micro-economic 
integration across the Western Mediterranean region. That is the reason why in the next section 
we will be revisiting the theoretical basis that help us understand the political economy of 
Algeria’s natural gas by looking into the literature on development economics, rentier states 
and international political economy. This is a necessary step before in section 3 we look at 
methodologies to integrate the Algerian gas sector into regional gas chains in the Western 
Mediterranean. 
3.Reviewing the theoretical basis as to assess the political economy of Algeria’s gas 
In this section we aim at conducting a brief theoretical and methodology literature review that 
will enable us to frame the domestic problem that we intend to deal with: by revising the 
literature that covers the problem of hydrocarbon-rich economies and development, we aim at 
better understanding Algeria as an underdeveloped rentier economy, which is heavily 
dependent on the rents accrued from exploiting the country’s natural gas and oil, and to what 
extent Algerian gas’ regional dimension gives ground to that reality.  
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There is a large body of research literature that tries to cover and better understand the impact 
of extractive (non-renewable) resource industry on an economy. In fact, the impact of natural 
resources has long attracted interest from a variety of angles and sources of development 
economics. Before the oil shocks of the 1970s, the focus was given to primary products 
generally, but after that, attention was extended subsequently to the impact on oil and other 
extractive industries’ exporters such as gas29. 
 The case for resource extraction as an engine for national/regional development was 
first underpinned by the classical theory of comparative advantage in international trade, which 
assumed that countries should focus on developing commodities in areas where they are 
relatively abundant. More specifically, the potential limits of resource extraction as a vehicle 
for development was first theorised by economic historian H. Innis in the 1920s who concluded 
that “specialisation around raw material extraction”, observing the case of Canada, “did not 
drive economic diversification but produced a dependent form of development”. He named it 
“staples trap”. On a different scale, neoclassical economics asserted that extractive resources 
are capital assets the value of which can be realised only when they are extracted and exported. 
Only then a “virtuous circle of economic upgrading” can be initiated30.  
 In addition, oil and gas developments are also often motivated by reference to specific 
theories of modernisation, such as the “big push” whereby in order for poor countries to be 
developed, the latter must break “the vicious circle of poverty” or must invest in large 
infrastructure projects31. In this line, others were of the opinion that development is constrained 
by low levels of investment, the so-called “capital fundamentalism” views that so widely 
dominated during the 1960s32. Indeed, Rostow states that capital accumulation is required in 
order to move a society from the beginning of take-off to maturity.  
 Hence, those same views defended that large amount of revenues accruing to an 
economy from extractive resource projects could generate the required “push” if capital was 
then mobilised accordingly. It then provides opportunities for a lead sector that creates a number 
of spill-overs, which drive economic expansion, moving the economy from “one equilibrium 
characterised by low level of development into a new equilibrium characterised by higher levels 
of socio-economic well-being”33. 
 More specifically, the “industrialising industries” concept of De Bernis (1967), which 
inspired some of the policies enacted in Algeria during the era of president Boumediene, 
stemmed from his analysis on power relations and the existing asymmetries within an economy. 
Based upon the previous works of François Perroux on “growth poles” (1955) and the impact 
of strong input-output linkages associated with the industry of certain territories, De Bernis 
defended that certain heavy industries have more chances to stimulate economic growth than 
the export-oriented industry. Therefore, he believed that the most rapid route to industrialisation 
was through import substitution and the most obvious vehicle to that end was the re-investment 
                                                          
29
 Stevens, Paul: “Resource impact – curse or blessing? A literature survey”, Journal of Energy Literature, vol. IX 
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of revenues accruing from extractive resource projects, so that the agricultural sector could be 
modernised and reformed, while the economic base of the country diversified in the long run.  
 This model, which inspired some of the policies enacted in Algeria during the president 
Boumediene’s era in the 1970s, stemmed from the belief that national development would come 
from an auto-centric view and not from foreign dependency. He pursued a programme of rapid 
industrialisation, financed by dramatic increases in hydrocarbon exports (Plan Valhyd) and 
austerity measures that curtailed domestic consumption. The expansion of gas export 
infrastructures absorbed much of the bulk of domestic consumption, and hence heavy industries 
received most of the attention. Since agriculture was underfinanced, Algeria turned into a food 
importer by the end of the era of president Boumediene, a strategy that some authors believe 
that it was drastically modified upon the arrival of president Benjedid, who succeeded 
Boumediene, and who abandoned this strategy in favour of the immediate needs of agriculture 
and education34. 
 In this line, as a consequence of the increase of national income for oil-exporting 
countries prompted by the first oil shock, the attempts by Algeria and other non-aligned 
countries to instore a New International Economic Order after the UN General Assembly of 
1974 falls under this very same conception of development economics, reassertion of national 
sovereignty and control over natural resource extraction and exploitation. Raising OPEC power 
in the late 1970s and the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution resulted in a rapid increase of oil 
prices, which prompted overflowing export revenues in Algeria. Producing countries were 
seeking a large share of rents for their resource exports. 
 Nonetheless, evidence for many years has suggested that those cases where resource 
extraction has generated national or regional development should be considered as remarkable 
exceptions rather than the general rule. The latter has been assessed when comparing data from 
many countries and concluding that many resource rich countries appear to have experienced a 
worse performance in terms of economic development and poverty reduction than many other 
resource poor countries35. The view that resource abundant countries created somewhat negative 
implications for national/regional development and turned these economies into something like 
“bizarre” in development economics had been defended previously by other authors 36 . 
However, others sought to argue that primary products could foster growth. 
 One of these core debates is commonly known as the “resource curse” thesis used for 
the first time by Richard M. Auty in 1993, and which tries to establish a negative relationship 
between resource abundance and poor economic performance.  
 The aftermath of the first oil shock in the 1970s gave ground to speculations that large 
windfall revenues from hydrocarbons could entail bad news for the development prospects of 
this type of exporting countries. Amidst such situation, a literature devoted to hydrocarbons 
began to emerge. Likewise, the experience of The Netherlands following the newly found North 
Sea gas revenues gave rise to the commonly known notion of “Dutch disease” 37 , de-
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industrialisation as a result of a real appreciation of the exchange rate following the gas export 
boom, which caused inflation and brought reductions in competitiveness.  
 The resource curse also draws arguments on the crowding out effects that take place 
when a big hydrocarbon project captures most of the resources of an economy at the expense 
of other sectors that find it difficult to secure the factors needed to develop. Others motivate the 
resource curse as a phenomenon related to the role of the government. Given that in most 
countries, hydrocarbon resources belong to the state, these authors believe that the curse occurs 
when bad governance or wrong decision-making 38  take shape, including in the form of 
widespread corruption39. Indeed, it was not until the 1990s that the impact of hydrocarbon 
revenues on government behaviour became the focus of attention when large scale revenues 
from such projects appear to change the way in which governments behave, causing damage to 
both growth and development prospects. Many schools of thought argued that government 
involvement in the allocation of rents would inevitably lead to their misallocation. 
 Against this backdrop, there is a large and growing literature that explains why the role 
of rent seeking is greater in countries with large hydrocarbon revenues40, and this could also be 
considered as an argument for the resource curse as it concerns how people in these economies 
compete for “artificially contrived transfers” 41 . The result is that government expenditure 
creates no social value and can subsequently distort markets and the way economy operates. 
This rent-seeking behaviour is more widespread in hydrocarbon rich economies as a 
consequence of wealth being concentrated in the public sector and possibly in a small number 
of companies42. A bureaucratic elite, a majority of whom can be members of a politically 
dominant group, is tasked with the channelling of the rents and block much needed economic 
reforms, along extremely powerful lobby groups that emerge as guarantors of the rent-
allocating system. 
 The foregoing analysis has mentioned rentierism as one of the evidences that countries 
might suffer “resource curse”, and as a common feature in hydrocarbon rich territories when an 
agreement exists for the collection and allocation of the national income. This term was firstly 
used by Mahdavi (1970), whilst Beblawi offered a very revealing definition of a rentier 
economy as the one where “the creation of wealth is centred on a small fraction of the society; 
the rest of the society is only engaged in the distribution and the utilisation of this wealth”43. 
This particular evidence of “resource curse” is relevant as it has often been applied at different 
degrees to Arab hydrocarbon producing states, including Algeria, due to Algeria’s dependence 
on hydrocarbons since independence. Therefore, one cannot explain the institutional, political 
and socio-economic developments in the country without properly assessing the role that rents 
accrued from the exploitation of the hydrocarbon industry have played in the context of a wider 
regional geo-energy space.  
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Mañé and de la Cámara44 offer a twofold analysis of the patterns unveiled in a rentier economy. 
On the one hand, a macroeconomic approach, whose theoretical foundation is supported by 
Mahdavi, Abdel-Fadil and Amuzegar. These authors believe that a hydrocarbon rich economy 
is rentier when the share of hydrocarbons in the GDP, exports, and tax revenues are very high, 
and when the GDP is elastic in relation with the evolution of the hydrocarbon prices. On the 
other hand, these authors45 also offer a political approach that is supported by Luciani and Lal 
when a country’s elite enacts and employs certain instruments of public intervention. These 
instruments pursue the obtaining of the maximum possible national income able to be 
distributed to the population as a whole, according to national legitimation strategies, by 
utilising the NOC with the primary goal of collecting (through property income or taxation) at 
the expense of other criterion such as maximising profits, establishing suitable distributing 
institutions. 
 Other recent literature has shown that the existence of rentier states not only impedes 
long-term economic growth and development46, but also serves as a strong impediment to 
democratic rule47, which prompts failures that are seen to lead to violence and civil war. 
 An OPEC founding member, Kuwait, has been classified by various authors as the most 
extreme rentier economy48 and autonomous state49 in the sense that the state does not rely on 
‘domestic taxation’ to function. Alternatively, the state relies on oil taxation, which is obtained 
thanks to an activity that is valued abroad, but which does not depend on the work of the local 
population. From this point of view, figure 5 shows the share of taxes in total state revenues for 
a time span of eleven years, excluding state hydrocarbon rents. Data shows that Tunisia and 
Morocco have followed a similar trend than the average of OECD countries where total taxes 
amount to well over 90% of state revenues; whereas the case of Kuwait is paradigmatic in this 
example because non-oil tax revenues are almost inexistent in the total state revenues, and the 
case of Algeria is somehow in between. 
 In fact, Mañé and de la Cámara50 assert that rentierism is not a condition that is reached 
as the volume of hydrocarbons in an economy increases, but instead when the income generated 
by the hydrocarbon sector is distributed over the time. From that standpoint, one would argue 
that Algeria, albeit considered a rentier economy, is less rent allocator than other OPEC 
members. In this context, the case of Kuwait is certainly the most extreme one.  
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Figure 5. Share of taxes in total state revenues (1993-2004), excluding hydrocarbon taxes 
 
Source: Own elaboration from data of Schwarz (2008) 
Beyond those listed views that have questioned the “resource curse” in its various forms, one 
of the most robust attempts to provide an alternative perspective to the “resource curse” is the 
Manchester School’s approach of Global Production Networks (GPN) applied to the extractive 
sector51. Henderson et al.52 define global production networks as the “globally organised nexus 
of interconnected functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which 
goods and services are produced and distributed”. The concept has many predecessors, ranging 
from global commodity chains (GCC) to global value chains (GVC), and the literature will be 
reviewed later. 
 Gavin Bridge argues53 that there seems to exist an undisputed consensus on the fact that 
cases of underperformance in hydrocarbon abundant economies are due primarily to state 
failure or inadequate governmental management. Hence, state’s institutional capacities and 
effectiveness provide an adequate measure on whether these economies work or not in favour 
general development 54 . Bridge believes that what is missing from the current debate on 
hydrocarbon abundant economies and development is a sense of “the relational way in which 
production is organised via inter-firm networks and massively exceed the boundaries of the 
nation state, and a mode of analysis, which is time and space sensitive”.  
As the foregoing analysis sustained by the literature on development economics is not properly 
embedded with a reality whereby a set of inter-firm networks exceed the boundaries of Algeria 
across the Western Mediterranean region, in the next section, we intend to offer some 
methodological approaches that aim at integrating the Algerian gas sector into regional gas 
chains. The result of this exercise will determine the degree to which Algeria’s internal 
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functioning is affected as a rentier economy. To that end, the next section is also offering some 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies to assess the level of interdependence between 
Algeria and the rest of the countries in the region. 
4.Methodologies to establish the linkage between the domestic and regional dimensions in 
the case of Algeria’s gas market: The global value chains and production networks 
Energy relations are an important intersection between politics, economy, history, law and 
geography, shaped by a combination of economic policy goals, geopolitical and geo-economic 
shifts in power along history, and environmental objectives.   
  
 As we have previously seen, there is a significant body of work in the literature on the 
challenges of extractive based forms of development. During the end of the second half of the 
20th century the changing nature of the international economy has triggered profound alterations 
in the business structure of many economic sectors. Hydrocarbon industries, and in particular 
natural gas, have not escaped this pattern through a surge of LNG trade, accompanied by a 
deeper process of integration associated with cross-border production chains and networks for 
making, selling, and transporting natural gas, what is commonly referred to as the gas supply 
chain. This process has transcended the boundaries of the nation-state and has become regional, 
and even global with the evolutionary dynamics of the LNG sector. 
 
 Therefore, this article proposes to use a framework approach that can make a meaningful 
contribution to the analysis of the political economy of energy in the countries concerned, in 
particular Algeria, by means of combining the internal (domestic) dimension of Algerian gas 
market with the relational external dimension (regional) of the gas market. 
 Amidst the potential frameworks to be used, some have placed at its core focus the 
concern with globally inter-organisational relationships that underpin the production of goods 
and the power and value dynamics therein, like the Global Commodity Chain (GCC), the Global 
Value Chain (GVN) or the Global Production Network (GPN) intellectual projects. To date, 
nevertheless, one must admit that none of the three have been commonly used as to explain the 
hydrocarbon industries 55 . That is also the reason why we propose to apply in a quite 
unprecedented contribution in the case of Algeria and the surrounding region, albeit other 
literature has addressed it to explain the gas industry in some other parts of the world56.   
 In this relational dynamic of industries and territories, it is worth mentioning the primary 
notion of filières, understood as a series of stages in manufacturing linked by the flow of trade 
(trade between suppliers and customers, or when these are integrated, the transfer of products 
between affiliates). Perroux57 was one of the first economists to apply this concept to industrial 
networks, whose different agents relate to each other asymmetrically, with some agents able to 
lead, thus exerting influence on the structure and operations over the rest of the filière. This 
basic concept was later re-introduced in the GCC framework. 
 In order to understand the dynamics of industrial organisation, international trade and 
regional development in accordance with the proposed approaches, the concepts of the value 
chain and commodity chain provide a valid starting point, in the sense that it has been 
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documented as far back as the 1960s in the context of development paths for extractive 
exporting economies. However, in the 1980s the term was commonly used in the business 
literature thanks to the works of Michael Porter. While his contributions provided limited utility 
in the analysis of socioeconomic dynamics and development, they provided many of the 
theoretical foundations for the value chain today58. In this context, the new institutionalism59 
has also helped explain the relationship that exists between the different components of the 
chain. 
 This concept was also transposed into economic geography by integrating value chains 
into a territorial context and was followed by a large body of literature on transnational 
corporations and regional development. Furthermore, with the consolidation of value chain 
efforts, the definition of value chains found in the literature has been very consistent over the 
past two decades and is defined as “a full range of activities that are required to bring a product 
or service from conception, through different phases of production, delivery to final consumers 
and final disposal after use”60. It is noteworthy to recall that, in the context of globalisation, the 
activities that constitute a value chain have generally been carried out in inter-firm networks on 
a global scale.  
 Furthermore, the concept of commodity chain was defined as “a network of labour and 
production processes whose end result is a finished commodity”61. The attention is given to the 
roles observed within the chain and how a fast-moving network of relations constantly 
reproduces a basic order that permits the endless accumulation of capital. 
 A turning point in the literature was the concept underpinning of GCC as “sets of inter-
organisational networks around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises and 
states to one another within the global economy”62. The latter very much stems from the 
previous works of Wallerstein, and it reformulates conceptual categories in order to analyse 
patterns of change and global organisation. Governance in the GCC is characterised as either 
producer-driven or buyer-driven, and it acknowledged the significant influence that leading 
firms exert on the structure and operations of the rest of the chain63. In this regard, Gereffi 
asserts that a producer-driven chain makes it easier for producers to control the chain due to 
the high barriers to entry, whilst a buyer-driven chain places a greater role to commercialisation, 
design and innovation in relation to the final product due to the fewer barriers to entering the 
productive sector. 
Since then, studies that have used the GCC framework have provided insights into a wide range 
of issues, including upgrading market expansion, trade patterns, as well as several industries, 
also for the hydrocarbon industry. 
 Akin to the GCC concept, the GVC framework64 allows one to better understand how 
global industries are organised by examining the structure and dynamics of different actors 
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involved along the chain of a given industry. The GVC analysis is built upon the previous GCC 
approach but extending it to non-commodity goods and widening some of its conceptualisations 
and analytical constructions as to make it more universally applicable. Hence, six basic 
dimensions are explored by the GVC, some of which are based upon the previous GCC: (1) 
input-output structure of a GVC; (2) geographic scope; (3) governance structure: lead firms and 
industry organisation; (4) upgrading; (5) local institutional context; (6) industry stakeholders. 
 Unlike the GCC/GVC approaches, the GPN concept becomes deliberately broader65. 
Indeed, all three frameworks intend to better assess the understanding of political economy of 
globalisation by examining how spatially distributed economic activity is functionally 
coordinated, but some stem from studies of international trade and take the commodity as their 
analytical unit (GCC); others emerge from industry studies and focus on issues of value chain 
management, innovation and sectoral management (GVC); while others highlight the 
dialectical interplay of territorial and network coherence, and allow for a broad range of actors 
beyond the firm (GPN)66. 
 GPN is defined as “the globally organised nexus of interconnected functions and 
operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which goods and services are produced 
and distributed”67. The concept has been developed and refined by a number of scholars from 
the Manchester School (Coe, Dicken, Henderson, Hess, Yeung…) and is the most inclusive 
framework of the three for the following reasons: (1) due to the explicit consideration of extra-
firm networks by necessarily encompassing the broad range of non-firm organisations (i.e. 
supranational institutions, trade unions and consumer groups) that may shape firm activities; 
(2) GPN is innately multilevel, thus embedding the interactions between all spatial scales from 
the local, to the regional and to the global; (3) it moves beyond the limitation of the “chain” 
notion and avoids a linear interpretation of how production systems operate and generate value; 
(4) the governance structure in the GPN is taken to be much more complex and variable over 
time than the one suggested by the other two frameworks; (5) the GPN analysis does not 
consider the network as an abstract object, but it rather focuses on the dynamic developmental 
impacts that result for both firms and territories that they interconnect. 
 GPN has not escaped controversy either. Sunley suggests that this view of networks 
often includes everything and lacks analytical boundaries and clarity, while it makes it difficult 
to validate empirical findings. In addition, Bair also questions whether GPN empirical studies 
have been that different from GCC research. 
 In general terms, GPN analyses have tended to focus on agriculture, manufacturing and, 
to a certain extent, service sectors, at the expense of extractive industries. Nonetheless, recent 
work on the oil and gas industries68 demonstrates that there is considerable potential unexploited 
under the lens of the GPN framework.  
The use of such frameworks (GCC/GVC/GPN) will become a useful mechanism as to assess 
the relational nature of the domestic dimension of the political economy of the Algerian gas 
vis-à-vis the political economy of gas in the Western Mediterranean region as a whole. 
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In the value chains involving energy products it is possible to distinguish between three 
productive stages: upstream, midstream and downstream. The upstream includes activities of 
exploitation, development and production of the primary energy source (in the case of natural 
gas, for example, this would include the search for gas fields, initial explorations, engineering 
projects, etc., and especially the extraction of natural gas). The midstream refers to all 
infrastructure related to the transportation and storage of the resource until it reaches the 
processing facilities, be it via physical interconnections (gas pipelines) or liquefied gas shipped 
in seagoing vessels. Finally, the downstream covers those activities required to transform the 
natural gas into the final energy product, as well as the activities linked to its commercialization. 
Figures 5 and 6 show how the production network and value chain are structured around the 
flow of natural gas from the upstream, midstream and downstream phases as part of an overall 
value creation process. Specifically, Figure 6 reflects the chain for natural gas transported by 
pipeline, whereas Figure 7 reflects the chain for LNG production. Likewise, the two figures 
include the main agents and countries that are active within each of the phases of the gas chain 
for the Western Mediterranean case, in which Algeria holds a central role as the only producing 
country. 
Figure 6. Conceptualising the natural gas production network / value chain 
 
Source: Own elaboration from The Petroleum sector Value Chain (WB, 2009) and BMI Research (2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
Transport by pipeline
From Algeria to Italy via Tunisia (Enrico Mattei pipeline)
From Algeria to Spain via Morocco (Pere Duran Farell pipeline)
From Algeria to Spain (MedGaz pipeline)
Firm A / B
Extraction and Processing 
(E&P)
Sonatrach (DZ), Total (FR), 
Engie (FR),  Eni (IT), Enel 
(IT), Edison (IT), Repsol 
(ES), Cepsa (ES)
State 1 (taxation, health & 
safety and environmental 
regulations)
Algeria
Transport (pipeline)
Sonatrach (DZ), Gas 
Natural Fenosa (ES), Cepsa 
(ES), Galp (PT), ONHYM 
(MO), Sotugat (TN), Eni 
(IT)
State 1/2 (taxation, health & 
safety and environmental 
regulations)
Algeria, Tunisia, Italy, 
Morocco, Spain, Portugal
Firm C
Transmission and 
Distribution
Enagas (ES), Snam Rete 
Gas (IT), GRT Gaz (FR), 
REN (PT)
State 3 (taxation, health & 
safety and environmental 
regulations)
Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, 
Morocco, Tunisia
Consumption
State 3 (taxation, health & 
safety and environmental 
regulations)
Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, 
Morocco, Tunisia
Revista UNISCI / UNISCI Journal, Nº 47 (Mayo/May 2018)  
47 
 
Figure 7. Conceptualising the LNG production network / value chain69 
 
Source: Own elaboration from The Petroleum sector Value Chain (WB, 2009) and BMI Research (2018) 
 
The value chains of energy products are becoming increasingly complex and include a greater 
number of links (or productive stages), with the companies involved also having different 
interests. Furthermore, the relationship between the different stakeholders in the value chain of 
energy products are not symmetrical, and not all stakeholders are able to exert the same 
influence over the chain as a whole. By using the above proposed methodologies, it is possible 
to observe how economic activity within the chain is coordinated and to identify which links 
(upstream, midstream and downstream) and which stakeholders (lead firms) have the greatest 
capacity to control the chain. A large part of the contribution to a territory’s development and 
of the interrelations between different territories depends on how energy value chains are 
structured and on the ‘power’ of the stakeholders located in different countries. Hence, the value 
is not only captured by analogous firms, but also amongst firms and non-firms entities such as 
state agencies, supranational institutions… The understanding of how this rent is captured along 
the network of agents that intervenes in the sector will help determine the roles that each of 
these agents play in the natural gas value chain, as well as the terms and conditions in which 
integration occurs. 
 At this point, we propose two approaches with the aim to assess the value captured by 
each of the agents, both private and public. The first one is qualitative by definition, and seeks 
to determine the relational nature of the different companies involved in the energy chain, whilst 
the second one is quantitative, and attempts to determine an index that quantifies the potential 
strength for each country involved in the energy chain. By this, one can infer about the degree 
of existing symmetry in the energy cooperation scheme, and in the objective for this article, 
assess the degree (or quality) of integration of Algeria with the rest of the region. A symmetrical 
energy cooperation scheme might facilitate higher degrees of integration at the macro level by 
prompting regulatory and institutional convergence leading to the enhancement of an energy 
community, what could be framed as a Western Mediterranean energy community. 
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4.1 A qualitative methodology 
The starting point for this methodology is that in the context of international energy chains, 
companies may be of two types: private (IOCs) or national (NOCs). As the motivation of these 
two types of companies will not be the same there is a significant difference with respect to 
non-energy value chains, whereby companies seek to achieve governance of the chain with a 
single objective: attaining as much as possible of the economic surplus generated by the chain. 
In the energy context, however, while the main objective of IOCs is to obtain the maximum 
possible profit (as much surplus as possible) from the value chain, the priority objective of 
NOCs will be defined in terms of the country’s ‘general interests’.  
 There is also the case which we define as hybrid (see Table 1), which is usually a private 
company that the government uses as if it were an NOC. Additionally, in the case of natural 
gas, we add a new typology of company that are regional companies, which we will call 
Regional Oil Companies (ROC), in line with the' usual' nomenclature, but which are normally 
companies focused on gas activity -although in some cases not exclusively- and whose main 
activity is regional, even if they could be active elsewhere in the world. 
 More specifically, we believe that the potential motivations of companies involved in 
energy value chains are to attain as much as possible of the surplus, which may be turned into 
national income or profit; to ensure a safe and constant supply of energy for ‘their’ economy; 
and to achieve greater influence as a stakeholder on the international stage. 
 Methodologically, the analysis of these two questions (i.e. that there are two types of 
stakeholder and that these may have up to three objectives, ranging from the micro level (more 
profit for the company) to the global level (being an important or hegemonic regional or global 
stakeholder) is favoured within the GCC/GVC/GPN approaches, since the latter integrate both 
micro/meso and macroeconomic aspects.  
 As a result of the particular characteristics described above it is necessary to redefine 
the producer-driven and buyer-driven categories of the energy GCC, although the need for such 
a redefinition in no way invalidates the use of the rest of the conceptual framework implicit 
within these categories. In particular, the concept of lead firm will be highly useful for our 
analysis of regional power. Indeed, in the case that concerns us here we consider that the type 
of governance which prevails in the chain (i.e. producer or buyer driven) depends, principally, 
on the type of company that establishes itself as the lead firm. For energy products the lead firm 
determines not only ‘what’ is produced, and ‘how’, but also ‘for whom’ and ‘for where’ the 
final product is destined.  
 These considerations are reflected in the classification of companies shown in Table 2. 
The categorization is based on the case of hydrocarbons (oil and gas). 
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Table 2: Categorization of energy companies (oil and gas) 
NOCs State-owned national oil or gas companies 
‘Old’ NOCs 
If the lead firm is an ‘old’ 
NOC the value chain is 
usually characterized by 
producer-driven behaviour. 
These are upstream companies, some of which will also engage in 
midstream activity, that serve as an instrument of national, public 
intervention, their main objective being to generate as much national 
income as possible for the producing country. Secondary objectives 
include helping to ensure a stable supply of energy and being a relevant 
stakeholder on the international stage. 
‘New’ NOCs 
If the lead firm is a ‘new’ 
NOC the value chain may be 
characterized by producer-
driven or buyer-driven 
behaviour. 
These are integrated companies with a broad scope (they act upstream, 
midstream and downstream) and are commonly found in what are known 
as emerging economies. They serve as an instrument of national, public 
intervention. The objective of ‘new’ NOCs is not always the same and, 
depending on the nature of national requirements, it is not always clear 
which is the primary objective. In general, some of these companies will 
have an objective similar to that of ‘old’ NOCs (national income), while 
the objective of others will be to ensure the final supply of energy to the 
country. In both these cases what ‘new’ NOCs have in common is that 
they are used as instruments to gain power on the regional or international 
stage. 
IOCs Integrated, private and transnational energy companies 
‘Western’ IOCs 
If the lead firm is a ‘Western’ 
IOC the value chain is 
generally characterized by 
buyer-driven behaviour, 
although depending on the 
company’s profit maximizing 
strategies it may be producer 
driven. 
These are the large, integrated, private and transnational energy companies 
that have been established in the Western countries of the OECD and 
which are clustered around the IEA. The majority of the most important 
ones are direct descendants of the ‘Seven Sisters’. These companies are 
associated with what are known as consumer countries, although their 
objective is that of private firms, i.e. to maximize profits in the value chain 
as a whole. Depending on the circumstances they may act more as 
extractors/producers or as demand/consumer companies. In both cases 
their objective is to obtain as much profit as possible.  
‘Hybrid’ IOCs 
With the exception of Russian 
companies, if the lead firm is a 
‘hybrid’ IOC the value chain 
is generally characterized by 
buyer-driven behaviour. 
These are integrated energy companies, generally in the East or in 
emerging economies, that are privately owned but which directly serve the 
interests of the government of their respective country. In this regard, and 
as in the case of ‘new’ NOCs, their objectives will depend on national 
priorities. However, unlike the ‘new’ NOCs hybrid companies are not 
usually strong enough to become significant regional or international 
stakeholders. 
ROCs Non Integrated, regional energy companies 
‘Transit ROCs’ 
There is no case in which a 
transit company is a' lead 
firm', but they have great 
influence because they 
control the transit of oil or 
gas. 
Depending on the cases, its objective may be purely fiscal, but in others it 
could serve to achieve an oil or gas supply on favourable terms. Both cases 
respond to national rather than private interests. 
‘Western or Hybrid ROCs’ 
If the lead firm is a 
‘Western’ ROC the value 
chain usually is 
characterized by buyer-
driven behaviour. 
These are public or private companies, whose regional activity is 
fundamentally focused on one or two phases of the chain (upstream, 
midstream and downstream). Although they may have investments 
elsewhere in the world, the bulk of their activity is carried out at regional 
level. In general, the business goal of these companies, such as those of 
the' Western IOC', with whom they often have alliances, is linked with 
that of consumer countries. 
Source: Mañé Estrada, Aurèlia et al., op.cit., 2012 
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We start by assuming that the degree of power a company has in the context of international 
energy relations does not depend on whether it is a NOC, a ROC or an IOC, but rather on how 
integrated it is (the more stages it is involved in the more influence it will have), on the number 
of territories in which it is present and on the amount of product (primary, secondary or final 
energy) it controls.  
 Thus, it is assumed that when a company forms part of a value chain it is more likely to 
become the lead firm if: a) it is an integrated company (i.e. its acts upstream, midstream and 
downstream); b) it operates in different countries (i.e. it is transnational, and therefore its raw 
material sites and/or markets are located in different places around the world); and c) it is among 
the world’s top-ranked companies in one or more of the three stages. Conversely, a company is 
unlikely to be the lead firm in the energy chain if: a) it is only present in one of the three stages; 
b) its sphere of activity is national; and c) it is not among the top-ranked companies for any of 
the three stages.   
 Thus, in general terms, the six kind of stakeholders defined above can be classified, as 
shown in Table 3, according to the amount of power they would have within regional or global 
energy chains. 
Table 3: Possibility of being the lead firm among energy companies, according to 
category 
 Integrated  Transnational  Top-ranked  Power in 
regional/global chain 
Possibility of 
being the lead firm 
‘Old’ NOCs No No Yes (upstream) Medium to low Weak 
‘New’ 
NOCs 
Yes Yes Yes (up-, mid- or 
downstream) 
High Strong 
‘Western’ 
IOCs 
Yes Yes Yes (mid- or 
downstream) 
High Strong 
‘Hybrid’ 
IOCs 
Yes No No Low to medium Very weak 
‘Transit 
ROCs’ 
No No No Medium to low None 
‘Western 
ROCs’ 
No Yes Yes (up-mid or 
downstream) 
Medium Strong 
Source: own elaboration from Mañé Estrada, A. et al., 2012  
Given that our case study is centered on the geo-energy space in the Western Mediterranean the 
only possible scenarios are those set out in Table 4. For the analysis of the energy chain in the 
natural gas the scenario involves a ‘new’ NOC70 becoming integrated in chains formed by other 
types of company, even if Sonatrcah's function within the country is still that of an' old NOC'. 
However, at the regional, level, different type of companies are involved in the Western 
                                                          
70
 The case refers to the integration of Algerian company Sonatrach with several other (private but also public 
owned) companies from Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, Morocco and Tunisia. State-owned Sonatrach is the largest 
oil and gas company in Algeria and Africa. The company operates in exploration, production, pipeline 
transportation and marketing of hydrocarbons and by-products. As part of a diversification strategy, Sonatrach 
stepped up investments in power generation, new and renewable energies, water desalination, and mining 
exploration and exploitation. The international strategy of the company includes operations in several parts of the 
world namely: in Africa (Mali, Niger, Libya, Egypt), in Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal, UK), in Latin America 
(Peru) and in the US. As well as being the world's 11th-biggest oil producer, Sonatrach is also the fourth-biggest 
global LNG exporter, the third-largest LPG exporter and the sixth biggest gas exporter. For all the above reasons, 
in this research paper we consider Sonatrach as a ‘new’ NOC, rather than an ‘old’ NOC, very much aware of the 
fact that in precise terms the company would stand somewhat in between what an ‘old’ NOC and a ‘new’ NOC 
are. 
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Mediterranean gas value chain, as can be deduced from Figures 6 and 7 and is reflected in Table 
4. 
Table 4: Who can be the lead firm in a value chain? 
If a ‘new’ NOC 
becomes integrated 
in a chain with: 
‘Old’ 
NOC ‘New’ NOC ‘Western’ IOC 
‘Hybrid’ 
IOC 
‘Transit 
ROC’ 
‘Western 
ROC’ 
Firms in the 
Western 
Mediterranean Gas 
Value Chain 
 Sonatrach 
Eni, Total, 
Repsol, Cepsa, 
Galp 
None Onhym, Sotugat 
The others 
in Figure 6 
‘New’ NOC I1:  Lead 
firm is 
the ‘new’ 
NOC 
I2: Outcome 
unclear. 
Different 
objectives? 
I3: Outcome 
unclear. 
Different 
objectives? 
I4: Lead 
firm is the 
‘new’ 
NOC 
I5: Lead 
firm is the 
‘new’ 
NOC 
I6: 
Outcome 
unclear. 
Different 
objectives? 
Source: own elaboration from methodology established by Mañé Estrada, A. et al., 2012 
Having established this kind of power relations among companies operating in the energy value 
chain, the incorporation of the geographical component into the analysis means that the 
following hypotheses can be proposed: 
a) In scenarios I2, I3 and I6, relationships within the governance structure are more 
symmetrical. The conditions under which the stakeholders become integrated within the energy 
value chain are more equitable and, therefore, their capacity to influence the institutional 
structure of the geo-energy space will be more similar. Thus, one can expect relations to be 
more cooperative, or extremely conflictive. In this case, the centre of the geo-energy space will 
be more diffuse and widely spread. With the passing of the time, this apparent symmetry in 
power relations might turn into more asymmetrical, depending on the degree of 
interdependence, the contracting terms among the various agents, the price evolutions, relation 
between demand and supply, the energy governance… This is the power relation that one can 
expect between companies like the Algerian Sonatrach with others that intervene in the value 
chain such as the Italian Eni and Enel, the Spanish Gas Natural and Cepsa, the French Engie, 
the Portuguese Galp,. 
b) In the event of scenarios I1 and I5, the governance structure and relations are asymmetrical. 
The natural resources or stakeholders from the territory of the ‘old’ NOC or ‘transit’ become 
integrated in a ‘position of inferiority’ and, therefore, have limited decision-making capacity 
within the institutional structure that develops in their geo-energy space. This is the power 
relation that one can expect between companies like Algerian Sonatrach with others that 
intervene in the value chain such as the Moroccan ONHYM or the Tunisian ETAP. 
4.2. A quantitative methodology  
The aim of this quantitative methodology is to attempt to measure the potential strength exerted 
by each country represented along the natural gas value chain through a synthetic index that we 
have entitled “INPSG”, regional index on the national potential strength for the natural gas 
(INPSG), which varies from 0 to 1. 
 Traditionally, the analysis of energy relations have been underpinned using a 
dichotomous energy paradigm, in which energy relations are dependent to different degrees, 
conflictive, antagonistic and developed between two type of countries: consumers and 
producers. The latter has led to the belief that producer countries were strong and consumer 
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countries weak in the power relationship. This paradigm does not take into account that national 
companies owned by the producing countries become stakeholders on the international energy 
stage, or even private companies from consumer countries become involved in the upstream 
phases of the energy extraction and production, thus discarding this paradigm and look for an 
approach that is able to better describe current energy relations. 
 From this perspective, if one includes a geographical component, then the producing 
territories, from a geo-energy point of view, are becoming integrated within larger energy 
spaces that do not always coincide with their immediate physical borders. Hence, one cannot 
always define energy relations as dependent, but rather inter-dependent, in which the agents 
that operate are not only producer and consumer countries, but also national companies –public 
and private-, as well as transnational companies –generally private. 
 To consider all the agents that intervene along a global or regional energy chain leads 
you to a fairly more complex model than the one depicted by the dichotomous energy paradigm. 
Therefore, attempting to assess the power relationship along this energy chain will be more 
complex too. 
 Based upon the GCC/GVC/GPN approaches, this synthetic regional index entails the 
construction of a country-based indicator made up by the aggregation of elementary variables. 
Attribution of weights to each elementary variable has followed a subjective approach, opting 
at this preliminary stage for the same weight for each of them. 
 In order to select the various elementary variables, we have followed the 
GCC/GVC/GPN approaches, in which different agents that intervene along the energy chain 
are identified: 
a) Exporting countries 
b) Importing countries 
c) Transit countries 
d) Companies 
 We assume that this index works in a regional natural gas space, in which at least one 
exporting country and one importing country are included, and whereby a set of energy 
relationships and physical interconnections exist. We have also assumed that the concept 
“national” encompasses all variables within that particular country, which are companies, 
consumers, pipelines, consumers… 
 Likewise, we have also assumed that the interdependence between exporting and 
importing countries is reflected upon two variables: the dependence on the hydrocarbon rent 
for the first ones and the energy consumption for the second ones. 
 A detailed description on the process leading to the definition and calculation of the 
“INPSG” can be found in Annex I. 
 The resulting synthetic index captures the strength that a country with all its heterogenic 
set of assets (companies, production, demand, consumption, hydrocarbon taxation, imports 
dependence…) features in the context of a geo-energy space. If a group of countries within a 
defined geo-energy space perform similarly in their respective indexes, one can infer that power 
relationship exerted by its different agents is leaning towards symmetry. Whilst if the respective 
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indexes show significant differences amongst them, one can conclude that this power 
relationship is leaning towards asymmetry.  
 The symmetrical nature of the power relationship among countries entangled in a 
regional natural gas chain is a relevant feature when assessing the conditions for which 
integration at the micro and mezzo levels along a series of cross-border and transnational 
relationships of dependency and physical integration could eventually lead to an integration 
process at the macro level through a shared energy governance. The more asymmetrical power 
relationships become, the less favourable spill over effects will emerge to progressively 
advance in the formation of an integrated energy region. Consequently, with less integration, 
the linkages between the domestic and the external dimensions of a country will remain weaker, 
whereas with a stronger integration, interdependence will also perform higher, thus showing 
more intense linkages between the domestic and the external dimensions of a country in the 
field where integration occurs. 
4.2.1. A practical case: the INPSG applied to the gas value chain between Algeria and 
Spain 
As the quantitative methodology outlined in section 3.2 (and Annexe I) of the present article is 
yet at a development phase, we have attempted to present some preliminary results when 
applying the INPSG to the particular case of the natural gas value chain between Algeria and 
Spain for the year 2016. In the current set of relations between these two countries the necessary 
conditions in order to apply the INPSG are met: there is one exporting country (Algeria) and 
one importing country (Spain), there is an abundant flow of trade of natural gas from Algeria 
to Spain through physical interconnections (two offshore pipelines, one direct and one via 
Morocco), as well as through sea vessels (LNG). 
 A calculation of the Index “INPSG” for Algeria and Spain in 2016 can be found in 
Annex II. 
 The results obtained when calculating the Index “INPSG” for Algeria (value of 0,77) 
and Spain (value of 1) in the year 2016 show a rather symmetrical power relationship along the 
natural gas chain involving the two countries, even if the index results show that Spain is a 
stronger partner in the energy chain.  
 If we look at the result of the first elementary index, which omits those variables that 
measure the potential strength of companies that operate in the gas chain, the index result shows 
an almost perfect symmetry. This is because both countries, Algeria and Spain, are very 
interdependent between them: in the year 2016 a significant portion of the gas exports from 
Algeria was sold to Spain, whilst a significant part of the natural gas that Spain imported came 
from Algeria. This symmetry is also expressed in how each country separately has developed 
strong domestic dependency patterns with the passing of the time, which ends up weakening 
the power capacity within the energy chain. Indeed, Algeria is highly dependent to function as 
a country on the economic rents accrued from the exploitation of the hydrocarbon sector, 
whereas Spain is still very dependent on energy imports, in spite of the very diversified 
country’s energy mix. 
 Secondly, if we look at the result of the second elementary index, which mainly captures 
the potential strength of companies operating in the energy chain, the result is more 
asymmetrical. In spite of the relative and apparent strength of the Algerian NOC Sonatrach, 
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which is the largest hydrocarbon company in Africa, Spanish companies are more integrated in 
the energy chain and are decisively present in the three phases of the chain. Spanish companies 
are not as big as Sonatrach, but they have better integrated in the chain, and thus they exert a 
higher control on the regional industry. 
 Thirdly, this result is consistent with the qualitative methodology featured in section 3.1 
of the present paper, in which relationships within the governance structure are more 
symmetrical in the event that a ‘new’ NOC becomes integrated in a chain with ‘Western’ IOCs 
and ‘Western’ ROCs (identified as scenarios I3 and I6 in Table 4). Precisely these are the two 
scenarios faced in this case study. The evolution of the energy cooperation in the region will 
considerably depend on whether the Algerian company Sonatrach asserts its position as a ‘new’ 
NOC by distancing from the characteristics depicted by an ‘old’ NOC, in which case asymmetry 
would widen in the energy chain; and also, it will very depend on how the ‘Western’ ROCs 
operating in the energy chain end up using in the future this additional power conferred in the 
current state of play. 
5. Conclusions  
Algeria is an underdeveloped rentier economy, which is heavily dependent on the rents accrued 
from exploiting the country’s natural gas and oil. Since the 1970s southern European countries 
have relied on multiple sources to meet their gas consumption requirements, most notably from 
Algeria, which has shaped the emergence of a geo-energy space in the gas sector among the 
Western Mediterranean countries, leading to the accretion of a series of cross-border and 
transnational relationships of dependency. 
 This article has featured a methodology that underpins the relational nature of the 
political economy of Algeria’s natural gas vis-à-vis the political economy of natural gas in the 
Western Mediterranean countries. Whereas Algeria’s overwhelming financial dependence on 
hydrocarbon resources (via economic rents) is directly linked to its decision-making capacity 
within the regional gas chain, this article has offered both qualitative and quantitative tools with 
the aim to catch up the relational effect between the Algerian domestic economy and the 
regional gas structure of governance. 
 To this end, the article has reviewed the literature that helps us better understand the 
political economy of Algeria, namely the the underlying problem of hydrocarbon-rich 
economies and their development. Secondly, the article has revised those existing 
methodological approaches that facilitate the establishment of a linkage between the Algerian 
domestic political economy of gas with the latter’s capacity of controlling and managing its 
own revenues and exports to the rest of the countries in the region concerned. In this regard, the 
introduction of methodological frameworks such as GCC/GVC/GPN provides us ground not 
only to assess the degree (or quality) of integration of Algeria with the rest of the geo-energy 
space but also of the future prospects for Algeria to remain a rentier economy. 
 Finally, the article has proposed two methodologies as to specifically assess the 
characteristics of the micro-integration process taking place along the natural gas regional 
energy chain, while inferring about the potential for macro or institutional integration. The first 
one is qualitative and has seek to determine the relational nature of the different companies 
involved in the energy chain, whilst the second one is quantitative, and has attempted to 
determine an index that quantifies the potential strength for each country involved in the energy 
chain. By this, one can infer about the degree of existing symmetrical patterns in the energy 
cooperation scheme, and in the objective for this article, assess the degree (or quality) of 
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integration of Algeria with the rest of the region. A symmetrical energy cooperation scheme 
might facilitate higher degrees of integration at the macro level by prompting regulatory and 
institutional convergence leading to the enhancement of an energy community, what could be 
framed as a Western Mediterranean energy community. 
 In this regard, the article concludes that the traditional analysis of rentier economies 
applicable to Algeria does not take sufficient account the interdependence between Algerian 
and other Western Mediterranean agents in the regional gas chain, a scenario that clearly limits 
the decision-making capacity of the Algerian agents within the institutional structure that 
develops in their geo-energy space.  
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ANNEX I: DESCRIPTION OF THE REGIONAL INDEX “INPSG” 
We assume that index “INPSG” works in a regional natural gas space, in which at least one 
exporting country and one importing country are included, and whereby a set of energy 
relationships and physical interconnections exist. We have also assumed that the concept 
“national” encompasses all variables within that particular country, which are companies, 
consumers, pipelines, consumers… 
Likewise, we have also assumed that the interdependence between exporting and importing 
countries is reflected upon two variables: the dependence on the hydrocarbon rent for the first 
ones and the energy consumption for the second ones. 
Considering all those, we have defined the following elementary variables and variables: 
1. Exporting countries (E): variable to measure the potential strength of exporting 
countries. This variable will be conditioned by the dependence of the producing country 
on the rents accrued from exploiting the country’s natural gas 
1.1. Variable (Eres): ratio of own natural gas reserves to world’s proven gas reserves 
1.2. Variable (Exp): ratio of own natural gas regional exports to the world’s natural 
gas exports 
1.3. Variable (Erent): ratio of State’s rent accrued from the exploitation of natural gas 
to the Gross Domestic Product 
 
2. Importing countries (I): variable to measure the potential strength of importing countries. 
This variable will be conditioned by the dependence of the importing country on the 
natural gas imports 
2.1. Variable (Imp): ratio of own regional imports of natural gas to the overall 
consumed natural gas  
2.2. Variable (Imix): ratio of own natural gas consumption to the general country’s 
energy mix 
2.3. Variable (Ipen): index on the penetration of natural gas in the country as compared 
to other importing countries in the region. If the penetration is higher than 30 
clients per 100 inhabitants then the index shall be 1; if the penetration is between 
20 and 30 clients per 100 inhabitants then the index shall be 0,66; if it is between 
10 and 20 clients per 100 inhabitants, it shall be 0,33; and finally if it is between 
0 and 10 inhabitants, it shall be 0 
 
3. Transit countries (T): variable to measure the potential strength of transit countries 
3.1. Variable (Tint): capacity to strategically interrupt the flow of natural gas across 
the region, be it “1” should the country have the capacity or “0” if the country 
does not have it 
3.2. Variable (Trans): ratio of volume of natural gas to the country’s energy mix  
3.3. Variable (Tdep): ratio of State’s rent accrued from the exploitation of natural gas 
transit across the country to the Gross Domestic Product 
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4. Companies (C): variable to measure the potential strength of companies that operate 
along the energy chain and whose fiscal residence belongs to one of the countries of the 
region 
4.1. Companies from exporting countries 
4.1.1. Variable (Cexpas): company’s total assets 
4.1.2. Variable (α): share of company in natural gas upstream projects  
 
4.2. Companies operating in transit countries 
4.2.1. Variable (Ctransas): company’s total assets 
4.2.2. Variable (β): share of company in transport (by pipeline or LNG) of natural 
gas in the region weighted by total volume of transit 
 
4.3. Companies from importing countries 
4.3.1. Variable (Cimpas): company’s total assets 
4.3.2. Variable (ω): market share of each company within the gas market of the 
importing country 
 
The procedure for calculating the regional index on the national potential strength for the natural 
gas (INPSG), which varies from 0 to 1, comprises three steps:  
(i) obtain a first elementary index (I1p ), which captures the strength of individual 
countries in the gas industry without encompassing the effects of operating 
companies in the natural gas value chain;  
(ii) obtain a second elementary index (I2p), which captures the strength of individual 
countries in the natural gas value chain based on its operating companies; 
(iii) obtain the resulting index (INPSG) by calculating the mean of the two previous 
indexes. 
To calculate the first of the elementary indexes I1p, the following function is needed: 
1′ = 	
 +  1 + 
1
	 + 
1
 +  + 	 +  + 
1

 + 
1
	 
Where I1p’ is the raw data value for each country in the region. To make the data comparable 
across countries in the region, each variable is rescaled from 0 to 1 with 0 denoting the lowest 
value and 1 the highest. The raw data value for each country needs to be indexed as follows: 
1 = 1′ − min1′max1′ − min 1 
Where Max/min denotes the bounds for best and worst performance for the group of countries 
in the region. 
As to obtain the other elementary index (I2p) the following function is needed:  
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Where I2p’ is the raw data value for each country in the region. To make the data comparable 
across countries in the region, each variable is rescaled from 0 to 1 with 0 denoting the lowest 
value and 1 the highest. The raw data value for each country needs to be indexed as follows: 
2 = 2′ − min2′max2′ − min 2 
 
Hence, the synthetic index INPSG is obtained by calculating the mean of the two previous 
indexes: 
*+,- = 1 + 22  
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ANNEX II: CALCULATION OF THE INDEX “INPSG” FOR SPAIN AND ALGERIA 
IN 2016 
On the one hand in Tables 5 and 6, we have calculated the two elementary indexes for Algeria 
and Spain in 2016 based on the methodology outlined in Annex I.  
Table 5. Calculation of the elementary index “I1p” (in ratio and index values) 
Variables Algeria Spain 
1.1. Eres 0,024 - 
1.2. Exp 0,7254 - 
1.3. Erent 1,18 - 
2.1. Imp - 0,55 
2.2. Imix - 0,162 
2.3. Ipen - 0,33 
3.1. Tint - - 
3.2. Trans - - 
3.3. Tdep - - 
Aggregation (I1p') 2,25 2,31 
I1p 0,97 1 
Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from BMI Research (2018), IMF (2018), CNMC 
(2018), OPEC and BP (2018) 
 
Table 6. Calculation of the elementary index “I2p” (in raw and index values) 
Natural 
gas 
chain 
4.1. Upstream 4.2. Midstream 4.3. Downstream 
Aggregation 
(I2p') I2p 
Algeria 43.277.520.000 16.327.398.844  - 59.604.918.844 0,56 
Spain 15.058.117.300 55.769.874.000 34.666.304.929 105.494.296.229 1 
Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from BMI Research (2018), AMADEUS database 
(2018) and Sonatrach (2018) 
 
Finally, in Table 7, we have calculated the Index “INPSG” for Algeria and Spain in 2016 
following the methodology outlined in Annexe I. 
Table 7. Calculation of the index “INPSG” for Algeria and Spain (2016) 
  I1p I2p INPSG 
Algeria 0,97 0,56 0,77 
Spain 1 1 1 
Source: Own elaboration 
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